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Abstract 
 
 
We report experimental evidence on the effect of observability of actions on 
bank runs. We model depositors’ decision-making in a sequential framework, 
with three depositors located at the nodes of a network. Depositors observe the 
other depositors’ actions only if connected by the network. Theoretically, a 
sufficient condition to prevent bank runs is that the second depositor to act is able 
to observe the first one’s action (no matter what is observed). Experimentally, we 
find that observability of actions affects the likelihood of bank runs, but 
depositors’ choice is highly influenced by the particular action that is being 
observed. Depositors who are observed by others at the beginning of the line are 
more likely to keep their money deposited, leading to less bank runs. When 
withdrawals are observed, bank runs are more likely even when the mere 
observation of actions should prevent them.  
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"I recently asked a group of colleagues -and myself- to identify the
single most important development to emerge from America’s
financial crisis. Most of us had a common answer: The age of
the bank run has returned." Tyler Cowen, The New York Times
(March 24, 2012 )
1 1. Introduction
During the Great Depression, much economic loss was directly caused by
bank runs (Bernanke, 1983). More recently, in 2007, the bank run on North-
ern Rock in the UK heralded the oncoming economic crisis. Since then,
several banks in other developed countries have experienced runs, such as
the Bank of East Asia in Hong Kong and Washington Mutual in the US.
Run-like phenomena have also occurred in other institutions and markets
such as money-market, hedge and pension funds (Baba, McCauley and Ra-
maswamy, 2009; Du e, 2010), the repo market (Ennis, 2012; Gorton and
Metrick, 2011) and even in bank lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).
Other examples of massive withdrawals in these markets and institutions
include the collapse of Bear Stearns, the Lehman experience and the depos-
itors’ run on Bankia, one of the biggest banks in Spain.
One of the leading explanations for the occurrence of bank runs concerns
the existence of coordination failure among depositors (e.g., self-fulfilling
prophecy). Depositors might rush to withdraw their money from a bank
without fundamental problems if they think that other depositors will do so
as well.1 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide the seminal model of coor-
dination problems among depositors. They represent the depositor coordi-
nation problem as a simultaneous-move game in which multiple equilibria
emerge, one of which has depositors participating in a bank run. Although
many researchers have continued to use and build on this model, descrip-
1The degradation of market and bank fundamentals (e.g. macroeconomic shocks, spe-
cific industrial conditions, worsening quality of the management) is the other main expla-
nation for the occurrence of bank runs (see for instance Allen and Gale, 1998; Calomiris
and Gorton, 1991; Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Gorton, 1988). Ennis (2003) cites exam-
ples of bank runs that occured in absence of economic recession and convincingly argues
that although historically bank runs have been strongly correlated with deteriorating eco-
nomic fundamentals, the coordination failure explanation cannot be discarded as a source
of bank runs. Gorton and Winton (2003) provide a comprehensive survey on financial
intermediation dealing in depth with banking panics.
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tions of real-world bank runs (Sprague, 1910; Wicker, 2001) and statistical
data (e.g. Starr and Yilmaz 2007) make clear that depositors’ decisions are
not entirely simultaneous but partially sequential. Many depositors have in-
formation about what other depositors have done and react to this informa-
tion when making their decisions (Iyer and Puri, 2012; Kelly and O Grada,
2000). As it is shown in Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2012a), the
information flow among depositors might have policy implications (e.g., for
the optimal design of deposit insurance); therefore understanding how ob-
servability of actions influences the emergence of bank runs is of first order
importance.
This paper attempts to capture the e ects of observability as a deter-
minant of bank runs, an issue that has mostly been disregarded by the
literature. In our model, we consider three depositors who di er in their
liquidity needs. There are two patient depositors and one impatient depos-
itor, so there is no aggregate uncertainty about the number of depositors of
each type. Depositors decide in sequence whether to withdraw their deposit
or to wait.2 The impatient depositor withdraws for sure, whereas patient
depositors get the highest possible payo  if they both wait. If at least one
patient depositor withdraws immediately, we say that a bank run occurs.
To allow for observability of decisions, our model builds on the assump-
tion that depositors are located at the nodes of a network and links enable
observability. Hence, a link connecting two depositors implies that the de-
positor who acts later can observe the other depositor’s action. Likewise, the
depositor who acts earlier knows that her action is being observed. Using
the standard convention in game theory we refer to simultaneous decision
when depositors decide without knowing the actions chosen by other, even
though decisions are made at di erent points in time. By contrast, sequen-
tiality implies that previous decisions are known. In our case, the connected
depositors play a sequential game, while the depositors who are not linked
play a simultaneous game. The social network structure determines then
the type of strategic interaction (simultaneous or sequential) and the infor-
mation flow among depositors.
We study the impact of di erent network structures on the emergence
of bank runs. We show theoretically that if the link between the first two
2We will use "to keep the money in the bank" and "to wait" in an interchangeable
manner.
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depositors to decide (henceforth, link 12) is in place, no bank run arises in
equilibrium (i.e., both patient depositors should wait). The link 12 (and
not the information it transmits) thus represents a su cient condition to
prevent bank runs. If the link 12 does not exist, bank runs may occur in
equilibrium. Hence, non-observability of initial decisions makes banks fragile
(multiple equilibria).
The idea of the link 12 as a su cient condition to prevent bank runs
represents a clear-cut prediction to be tested in a controlled laboratory ex-
periment. We thus designed an experiment to mimic the setup described
above.
In line with our theoretical prediction, we find that those network struc-
tures that have the link 12 produce the smallest probability of bank runs
and are the most e cient ones (i.e., generate the highest total payo s). We
also provide evidence that non-observability of decisions make banks fragile
(bank runs are more frequent) but show that observability of decisions af-
fects bank runs in a concrete manner as observing early withdrawals triggers
runs as well.
Our findings are consistent with the individual decisions at the depos-
itors’ level. We observe that link 12 (as well as the link 13) significantly
reduces depositor 1’s withdrawal rate, with respect to the case of no links.
Regarding depositor 2, the experimental data show the importance of the
link 12. Depositor 2’s likelihood of withdrawal is significantly lower when
she observes a waiting, but is higher upon observing a withdrawal. The
latter finding goes against the theoretical prediction. Observing previous
decisions is also important in the case of depositor 3, who is less likely to
withdraw if she observes a waiting or the two previous actions.
Overall, the results gleaned from our experiment suggest that depositor
1’s behavior is mainly driven by the fact that her action is observed. By
waiting, depositor 1 can induce the other patient depositor to follow suit.
Depositors 2’s and 3’s departures from equilibrium predictions point out
the importance of observability of decisions. In particular, a link at the
beginning of the sequence can prevent the emergence of bank runs, but
only when depositors observe a waiting. If a withdrawal is observed, then
bank runs may be even more frequent than in the case without observability
(i.e., social networks can promote runs). Importantly, these runs cannot
be explained by coordination in a simulatenous setup nor by fundamental
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problems of the bank, the two main culprits identified by the literature.
Panic-based bank runs are identified in our context, where depositors decide
sequentially.
To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first to use a net-
work to model information flow among depositors in the classic bank-run
problem. While there are other studies in which depositors may observe
previous decisions (e.g. Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss, Rosa-Garcia
and Rodriguez-Lara 2012a), those studies analyze only the extreme cases:
nothing vs. all previous actions observed. We study systematically all infor-
mation setups, including the possibility of partial observability. The afore-
mentioned empirical studies (Kelly and O Grada, 2000; Starr and Yilmaz,
2007 and Iyer and Puri, 2012) suggest that during real bank runs observabil-
ity is in fact partial, making our investigation relevant and complementary
to the existing results. Although we focus on banks, run-like phenomena oc-
cur in other institutions and markets as well (such as money-market, hedge
or pension funds) and our analysis applies analogously to them.
In the next section, we present our model and derive the theoretical
prediction. In Section 3 we detail our experimental design. Section 4 re-
ports our experimental results, which are discussed in light of the existing
literature in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Theoretical Setup
This section presents our theoretical model, which considers a coordination
problem among three di erent depositors. In our framework, decisions are
taken sequentially and there is neither fundamental uncertainty about the
bank, nor uncertainty regarding the liquidity types of depositors.3
3We consider a small number of depositors so that agents in our model can be inter-
preted as big creditors in the wholesale market or large investors in a hedge fund. Models
involving few depositors are often analyzed in the literature that focuses on bank runs
(e.g., Green and Lin, 2000; Peck and Shell, 2003). The experimental literature on bank
runs does also consider a few number of depositors (e.g., Trautmann and Vlahu, 2013).
The interested reader on a more general approach to our problem can consult Rosa-Garcia
and Kiss (2012).
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1.1 2.1. The Underlying Model
Consider three depositors who deposit their endowment of e > 0 monetary
units in the bank at t = 0. The bank invests the deposits (3e) at t = 0
and the investment earns a positive net return only if not liquidated until
t = 2. If investment is liquidated at t = 1, the net return is zero. We do
not consider liquidation costs. The deposit contract specifies the depositors’
payo s depending on two factors: (a) depositors’ choice at t = 1, and (b)
the available funds of the bank.
Two of the depositors are patient and one is impatient. The latter su ers
a liquidity shock at the beginning of t = 1 and only values payo s at t = 1,
so she withdraws always in that period. Patient depositors do not need
their funds urgently, they value payo s in both periods (t = 1, 2). Types
are private information. There is no aggregate uncertainty and the number
of patient and impatient depositors is common knowledge (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983).
Depositors decide sequentially according to their position in the line that
is known to them. Position is determined randomly and exogenously and
any depositor has the same probability to be at any position. Positions are
independent of types (e.g., the impatient depositor is not more probable to
be at the beginning of the sequence).
1.1.1 2.1.1. Payo s
Any depositor can withdraw at time t=1 and receive c1(.)or wait until period
2 and receive c2(.). The payo  that depositors receive depends on their
decisions, but also on the position in the line since it is related to the available
funds of the bank.4 We denote period-1 payo s as c1(xw), where x is the
number of previous withdrawals (w). Period-2 payo s are denoted as c2(yw),
where y indicates the total number of withdrawals in period 1.
In the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we assume that c1(0w) =
c1(1w) > e > c1(2w). In words, the bank commits to pay c1(0w) to the first
two withdrawing depositors. This amount is higher than the depositor’s
initial endowment (e) because it is assumed that the immediate withdrawal
yields a payo  equal to the initial endowment plus an interest (in the Di-
4This is one of the main di erences with respect to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), as
depositors who withdraw in our model are served sequentially depending on their position
in the line, instead of in a random order.
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amond and Dybvig’s model, the interest exists because of the risk-sharing
feature of the first best allocation). If a depositor withdraws after two
withdrawals, then she gets the remaining funds in the bank c1(2w), which
amounts to less than her initial endowment e. This is the case, since if ev-
erybody withdraws, then all investments are liquidated at t = 1, and hence
no net return is earned.
We also assume that c2(1w) > c1(0w) > c2(2w). That is, for a patient
depositor it pays o  to wait if the other patient depositor waits as well.
Otherwise, she is better-o  if she withdraws early (in position 1 or 2).5 We
assume that if only one depositor waits, she earns more than by withdrawing
after two withdrawals, but still her payo  falls short of the initial endowment.
That is, e > c2(2w) > c1(2w).
Overall, the relation between the payo s is the following:
c2(1w) > c1(0w) = c1(1w) > e > c2(2w) > c1(2w) (1)
We rely upon this relation of payo s in our experimental design, described
in Section 3.
1.1.2 2.1.2. Networks
We model the information flow among depositors through a network. A
network is the set of existing links among the depositors. Two depositors
are neighbors if a link connects them. A link is represented by a pair of
numbers ij for i, j œ {1, 2, 3}, i < j. For instance, 12 denotes that depositor
1 and depositor 2 are linked; therefore, depositor 1 knows that depositor 2
will observe her action and that depositor 2 chooses after observing depositor
1’s action. We assume that the network structure is not commonly known,
information is local and thus no depositor knows whether the other two
depositors are connected. Links are independent of types, so depositors of
the same type are not more likely to be linked, nor is there any relationship
between types and the number of links.
In the case of three depositors, there are 8 possible networks: (12, 23, 13),
(12, 23), (12, 13), (13, 23), (12), (13), (23), (ÿ), where (ÿ) stands for the
empty network, which has no links at all, whereas the structure (12, 23, 13)
5Note that c2(1w) and c2(2w) are only defined for patient depositors who waited in the
first period. In that regard, c2(0w)does not exist because the impatient depositor always
withdraws at t=1.
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contains all the possible links and is called the complete network. The empty
network can be interpreted as a simultaneous-move game where depositors
have no information about other depositors’ actions, as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). On the other hand, the complete network represents a fully
sequential setup, meaning that depositors observe all predecessors’ actions.
1.1.3 2.1.3. Decisions and types
At the beginning of t = 1, depositors learn their types, their links and
their position in the sequence of decisions (i = 1, 2, 3). Private types and
equiprobable positions imply that only the conditional probability of the
type sequence is known. For instance, if depositor 1 is patient, then both
type sequences (patient, patient, impatient) and (patient, impatient, pa-
tient) have probability 1/2. Since the impatient depositor always withdraws
at t = 1, we focus on the patient ones. They derive utility u(.) from payo s
at any period, where uÕ(.)>0 and uÕÕ()<0. When patient depositors are called
to decide at t = 1, they may either keep the money in the bank or withdraw
it. Depositors cannot trade directly and they decide once, according to their
position in the sequence.
1.2 2.2. Theoretical prediction
In order to derive a theoretical prediction, we first define a bank run in the
following way.
Definition. A bank runoccurs if at least one patient depositor with-
draws.
This definition is the broadest, and accordingly, a withdrawal due to a
patient depositor already constitutes a bank run.
Proposition. If the link 12 exists, any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) satisfies the condition that bank runs do not occur. In any network
in which the link 12 does not exist, there are multiple equilibria, so bank runs
may occur in equilibrium.
Proof: The rationale for this proposition relies on the fact that depos-
itor 3 has a dominant strategy and always waits if patient. Waiting yields
a higher payo  than withdrawal if the other two previous depositors have
withdrawn (u(c2(2w)) > u(c1(2w))) or if only the impatient depositor with-
drew u(c2(1w)) > u(c1(1w)).
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Consider next the case when the link 12 exists and depositor 2 observes
a waiting. Since u(c1(0w)) < u(c2(1w)), a patient depositor 2 waits after
observing a waiting. Hence, in any equilibrium a patient depositor’s optimal
strategy is to wait when i) observing a waiting in position 2; ii) being in
position 3.
Given the existence of the link 12 and the equilibrium strategies previ-
ously described, as a consequence of sequential rationality a patient deposi-
tor 1 knows that if she waits, the other patient depositor will wait as well.
Therefore, in any equilibrium a patient depositor 1 should wait if the link
12 exists.
Consider a depositor 2 who observes a withdrawal. In a PBE, consis-
tency of beliefs requires that she assigns probability 1 to depositor 1 being
impatient, given that equilibrium strategies imply that a depositor 1 who
is patient waits always. Therefore, when observing a withdrawal she must
assign probability 1 to depositor 1 being impatient (i.e., depositor 2 assigns
probability 1 to depositor 3 being patient). In that case, given the payo s
depositor 2 should wait as well in any equilibrium.
As a result, if the link 12 is in place any equilibrium strategy profile
requires that patient depositors wait in any information set that may arise
(being in position 1; being in position 2 and observing either a waiting
or a withdrawal; being in position 3 and observing anything). Thus, the
behavioral strategy profile in which all patient depositors wait is the unique
PBE.6
The second part of the proposition assumes that link 12 does not exist.
We show multiplicity of equilibria by constructing a no-bank-run and a bank-
run PBE. A profile of strategies in which patient depositors wait always in
any position is a no-bank-run equilibrium. Recall that a patient depositor
in the third position waits in any equilibrium. If the strategy of depositor
1 (depositor 2) when patient is to wait, then the best response of depositor
6There exist other strategy profiles that are Bayes-Nash equilibria that lead to bank
runs but they are not PBE. For instance, imagine that depositor 3 is impatient and
the network is complete (just to make things simpler). The strategy profile in which
depositor 2 always withdraws is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This occurs because a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium is not imposing beliefs on the continuation game. Thus, if depositor 2
decides to withdraw regardless of what depositor 1 does, then depositor 1’s best response
is to withdraw as well. By using the concept of PBE we constrain o -equilibrium beliefs
and eliminate the possibility of depositor 2 choosing withdrawal after observing a waiting.
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2 (depositor 1) is also to wait. Therefore for the patient depositors "waiting
at any position" defines a PBE.
In the bank-run equilibrium, consider the profile of strategies where
depositors 1 and 2 withdraw if patient. Assuming expected-utility maxi-
mizing depositors, note that if depositor 1 (depositor 2) withdraws if pa-
tient, the best response of depositor 2 (depositor 1) is also to withdraw
if u(c1(0w)) > 12 [u(c2(1w)) + u(c2(2w))] is satisfied. This is the case be-
cause Bayesian updating requires that depositor 2 (depositor 1) believes
that depositor 1 (depositor 2) is patient or impatient with probability 12 .
Thus if the link 12 is absent, for c1(0w) high enough (but maintaining that
c2(1w) > c1(0w)), there exists a bank run equilibrium. As a result, there
are multiple equilibria.
Proposition 1 establishes that in the set of networks comprised of {(12, 23, 13), (12, 23), (12, 13), (12)}
bank runs should never occur. The existence of the link 12 helps us to dis-
entangle network structures in which the equilibrium is unique and network
structures in which there is multiplicity of equilibria. If the link 12 exists,
the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium predicts that patient depositors will
wait regardless of their position in the line. Therefore, a bank run that oc-
curs in the presence of the link 12 cannot be explained by fundamentals or
coordination on the bank run outcome. When the link 12 does not exist,
there are multiple equilibria.
Although there is no clear-cut prediction in the absence of the link 12, we
formulate some conjectures on what can be expected. On the one hand, the
existing experimental evidence in setups with no aggregate uncertainty (e.g.
Garratt and Keister (2009)) predicts the no–run–equilibrium. On the other
hand, Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) highlight the benefits of information
and find that more information leads to a better outcome because depositors
withdraw later (see also Brandts and Cooper (2006), Choi, Gale and Kariv
(2008), Choi et al., (2011), for experimental evidence on the e ects of infor-
mation on coordination). Hence, our conjecture is that network structures
that contain a higher number of links would perform better than networks
with less links. Since links enable observability of actions in our model, a
patient depositor at the beginning of the line can interpret that it would be
easier for the following depositors to wait if they observed a waiting from
depositor 1 or depositor 2. In that vein, depositors 1 and 2 would be more
likely to wait if linked with depositor 3.
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2 3. The Experimental Design
A total of 48 students reporting no previous experience in laboratory exper-
iments were recruited among the undergraduate population of the Univer-
sidad de Alicante. Students had no (or very little) prior exposure to game
theory and were invited to participate in the experiment in December 2008.
We conducted two sessions at the Laboratory of Theoretical and Experi-
mental Economics (LaTEx). The laboratory consists of 24 computers in
separate cubicles. The experiment was programmed and conducted using
the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions were read aloud with
each subject in front of his or her computer. We let subjects ask about any
doubts they may have had before starting the experiment.7 The average
length of each session was 45 minutes. Subjects received on average 12 Euros
for participating, including a show-up fee of 2 Euros.
In both sessions, subjects were divided into two matching groups of 12.
Subjects from di erent matching groups never interacted with each other
throughout the session. Subjects within the same matching group were
randomly and anonymously matched in pairs at the end of each round. Each
of these pairs was assigned a third depositor, simulated by the computer so
as to create a three-depositor bank. Subjects knew that one of the depositors
in the bank was simulated by the computer.
Depositors deposited e=40 pesetas in each round in the bank and were
asked to choose between withdrawing or waiting.8 The payo  consequences
of each action were explained to subjects using Table 1.
Table 1. Payo s of the experiment
The rationale of these payo s is that the bank commits to pay c1(0w) =
c1(1w) = 50 to the two first withdrawing depositors. If a depositor with-
draws after two withdrawals, then she gets the remaining funds in the bank
c1(2w)= 3e ≠ c1(0w) ≠ c1(1w) = 20. If a depositor decides to wait, her
7The instructions are in the Appendix A.
8We used Spanish pesetas in our experiment, as this practice is standard for all exper-
iments run in Alicante. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates
integer problems, compared with other currencies (USD or Euros, for example). On the
other hand, although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use, Spanish people still use pe-
setas to express monetary values in their everyday life. In this respect, by using a "real"
currency we avoid the problem of framing the incentive structure of the experiment using
a scale (e.g., "experimental currency") with no cognitive content.
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payo  depends on the action of the other patient depositor. If both of them
wait, then the investment project earns a positive net return and the bank
pays c2(1w)=70 to each of them. If only one patient depositor decides to
wait, then the available money after two withdrawals (20 pesetas) earns
the returns of the investment (10 units) and then this amount given to the
depositor who waited, that is c2(2w)=30.9
Before making their decisions, subjects were informed about their posi-
tion in the line, the decisions they were able to observe (as determined by
the network) and the links to subsequent depositor(s). Subjects were aware
that the information structure and the position in the line were equiprobable
and exogenously determined. It was commonly known that position in the
line, the network structure, or both changed in each round. Once subjects
made their choices in a particular round, they received information about
their own payo  and a new round started. At the end of the experiment,
we paid subjects for the 15 rounds.
We mention a few noteworthy aspects of the experimental design. First,
types (patient or impatient) were not publicly observed in our experiment,
and there was no aggregate uncertainty about the number of patient and
impatient depositors. This feature of our design is in line with the original
model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and makes our model divert from
other experiments in which the number of depositors who are forced to
withdraw is unknown (e.g., Garratt and Keister, 2009). Second, a random
position in the decision-making sequence was assigned to each participant
because our theoretical model relies upon the assumption that positions
are known (as is the case in theoretical models like Andolfatto, Nosal and
Wallace, 2007; Ennis and Keister, 2009; Green and Lin, 2000). The aim
of our experiment is to investigate the depositors’ behavior in all possible
scenarios. By assigning subjects a random position in the line (instead of
allowing them to decide), we control for this feature and collect information
about depositors’ behavior in many di erent environments.10
9Note that the amount that a patient depositor gets if she waits alone is smaller than
her initial endowment. Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2012a) interpret the value
of c2(2w)as the level of deposit insurance and investigate how c2(2w)a ects the likelihood
of bank runs depending on whether decisions are sequential or simultaneous.
10The optimal decision on when to go to the bank has not been studied in theoretical
models of bank runs, thus we study all the possible sequences. We note that if we allowed
subjects to decide when to go to the bank, we might lack observations for instance with
the computer at the beginning of the sequence.
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3 4. Experimental Evidence
This section reports our experimental evidence. In Section 4.1 we provide
some summary statistics of our behavioral data and perform statistical tests
to see how the presence of link 12 a ects the likelihood of bank runs. We also
discuss in that section how the depositors’ behavior may be a ected by what
is being observed. A regression analysis to disentangle how the presence of
the links and what is being observed a ects the withdrawal decision of each
depositor is presented in Section 4.2, where we also control for the e ect of
the experience in previous rounds. For simplicity, we refer in both sections
to the impatient as the computer, whereas experimental subjects are called
simply depositors.
3.1 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Aggregate Analysis
We summarize the data gathered during the experimental sessions in Ta-
ble 2. We report the network structure in the first column. The second
column specifies the position of the computer, and the third column shows
the number of observations.11 In the next three columns, we present the
frequency of withdrawal for depositors 1, 2 and 3. The bank run column
indicates the frequency of bank runs in each scenario. Recall that there is no
bank run if neither of the two (patient) depositors withdraws; therefore, this
column contains the likelihood of the complementarity of that event. We
compute deviations from the maximum possible payo  that can be received
(190 pesetas) and report them as "E ciency losses". We rank the infor-
mation structures according to the level of e ciency in the next column.
Finally we pool the data in the last three columns ignoring the computer’s
position, which is not observed by subjects in our experiment.
Table 1: Table 2. Likelihood of bank runs
To appreciate the e ect of the network structure, it is worth looking first
at the pooled data in the last three columns. At the top of the ranking, we
11We had a problem in one of the banks and were not able to record the subjects’
decision in one of the rounds; so we have 718 observations (instead of 720) coming from
the 48 subjects choosing during 15 rounds.
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can see that networks that produce the smallest likelihood of bank runs and
then the minimum e ciency losses have the link 12. The network structures
at the bottom of the ranking -that perform worse in terms of bank runs
and e ciency- do not have this link. On average, the likelihood of bank
run when there is (there is not) link 12 is 0.27 (0.51), respectively. The test
of proportions rejects the null hypothesis that bank runs are equally likely
in both cases (z = 4.51, p-value=0.000).12 We do pairwise comparisons
and test the null hypothesis that the frequency of bank runs in any network
structure with the link 12 is the same as the frequency of bank runs in a
network without this link against the alternative that bank runs are less
likely when there is link 12.13 We reject that null hypothesis except when
we compare (12,13) or (12) against (13,23) or (13). In all the remaining
cases, the rate of withdrawal is always significantly lower in the networks
with the link 12. Though these results do not correspond literally to our
theoretical prediction, which establishes that no bank run will be the unique
equilibrium if the link 12 exists, we observe that there are considerably less
bank runs in networks where the theory predicts none, than in those where
multiple equilibria are predicted.
We also conjectured that depositors might interpret links as an important
device to make observable that they wait, inducing the other depositor to
do so as well, and hence making bank runs less likely. Conditional on the
existence of the link 12, the complete network (12,13,23) is the best one in
terms of e ciency, whereas the network (12) produces the highest likelihood
of bank runs. Statistically, the former produces significantly less bank runs
than the latter (p-value= 0.016). We can also see in Table 2 that if the link
12 does not exist, then bank runs are less likely to occur in the network
(13,23) than in (13) and (23), which do perform better than the empty
network. Again, the di erence between bank runs in the network (13,23)
and in the empty network is statistically significant (p-value= 0.044). Our
first result summarizes these findings and confirms our theoretical prediction
that banks are fragile in the absence of the link 12.
Result 1 The network structure matters and plays a key role in determining
12All the statistical tests in this section refer to the test of proportions.
13When performing pairwise comparisons, we always correct for multiple testing using
the Bonferroni correction. This is the most stringent method to avoid type I errors. The
interested reader can see Appendix B for the values of the statistics and further details
on the statistical tests.
14
the likelihood of bank runs and the level of e ciency. In particular, the
link 12 significantly reduces the likelihood of bank runs and produces the
highest levels of e ciency. Bank runs are less likely when the network
structure has more links, both when there is link 12 and when there is
not
To further appreciate the e ect of the network structure, we look now at the
disaggregated data which account for the computer’s position. The ranking
in Table 2 indicates that the top-five network structures have the link 12. On
the contrary, four out of five network structures at the bottom of the ranking
do not contain this link. As an example, in the empty network depositors
know their position, but it is of no help to prevent bank runs. As a result,
the frequencies of bank runs are among the worst ones. Contrariwise, we
see that the complete network has the lowest frequency of bank runs (0%
and 14%), which suggests that if information abounds due to the existence
of many links, then bank runs are less likely to occur. However, in the
complete network, it is also worth noting that when the computer is the
first one to decide, the frequency of a bank run surges and reaches a level
that is comparable to the case of the empty network. This is an indication
that both the amount of information and what is being observed matter.
Theoretically, we have seen that the existence of the link 12 prevents
bank runs by inducing depositors 1 and 2 to wait. We see in Table 2 that
depositor 1’s withdrawal rate is between 0% and 25% when the link 12 is
present, whereas it is between 18% and 73% when the link 12 does not ex-
ist. The evidence is not so clear for depositor 2 as her decision seems to
be a ected by the position of the computer. In particular, when the link
12 exists, depositor 2 is more likely to withdraw when depositor 1 is the
computer. As a result, we observe that conditional on the existence of the
link 12, the likelihood of bank run is always higher when depositor 1 is the
computer (z=3.84, p-value=0.000). This suggests that observing a with-
drawal with certainty plays a role in depositor 2’s decision. We summarize
our findings regarding the link 12 as follows.
Result 2 The e ect of link 12 depends on the computer’s position. When
the first depositor to decide is the computer, the link 12 significantly
increases the likelihood of bank runs, otherwise the frequency of bank
runs significantly decreases in the presence of link 12.
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Our theoretical prediction establishes that non-observability of decisions
makes banks fragile (multiple equilibria) and the existence of the link 12
represents a su cient condition to prevent bank runs. Our result 2 high-
lights that observability a ects the emergence of bank runs but the action
that is being observed is also important to explain behavior. In the pres-
ence of the link 12, when the computer is in position 1, a withdrawal will
be certainly observed at the beginning of the sequence and it may trigger a
run. The beneficial e ects of the link 12 therefore materializes when the first
depositor to decide is not the computer, so that she can induce the other
depositor to follow suit.
Finally, remember that depositor 3 has a dominant strategy to wait. In
our data, depositor 3 waits in more than 80% of the cases (i.e., 194 out of the
239 decisions correspond to waiting). All the 48 subjects that participated in
our experiment were at position 3 at least three times. Among them, a total
of 20 (19) never withdraw (withdraw once) in position 3. Only 6 of our
48 subjects withdraw more frequently than they wait. We then conclude
that most of the subjects behave according to the theoretical prediction
and decide to wait. In Table 2, however, we observe that the likelihood of
withdrawal varies between 0% in the networks (13,23) and (23), and 42% in
the network (12,13), in all these cases being the computer the first to decide.
These findings seem to suggest that observing previous decisions can a ect
depositor 3’s behavior. A detailed analysis of depositors’ behavior in each
position is presented in the next section.
3.2 4.2. Depositor’s Behavior and Econometric Analysis
We have seen the importance of the link 12 in reducing bank runs. In this
section we analyze the depositors’ behavior more in detail. Our aim is to
disentangle the e ect of links and the observed actions on depositors’ behav-
ior, controlling for the e ect of experience whose e ect cannot be gleaned
from Table 2. For example, one of the questions to be addressed is whether
depositor 2 simply cares about the presence of the link 12 (as the theory
predicts) or if she is also a ected by what is observed. We also want to
investigate whether deviations from the equilibrium prediction of depositor
3 occur in a particular manner.
For each depositor i = 1, 2, 3, we estimate a logit model in which the
dependent variable is the probability of withdrawal of the depositor in posi-
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tion i, Pri(w). Because the depositor 1’s decision may depend on the links
that she has we propose the following specification for depositor 1:
Pr
1
(w) = z(–0 + –1L12 + –2L13 + –3L12L13 + –4History) (2)
where z(z) = ez/(1 + ez) and the explanatory variable Lij is defined as
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 (0) when link ij is (not) present
for i = 1 and j œ {2, 3}. L12L13 is then obtained as the product of the
two dummy variables L12 and L13, and it stands for the cases in which
both links are present (networks (12, 13) and (12, 13, 23)). L12L13 enables
us to see whether there is some additional e ect of having both links apart
from the e ect that the links generate separately. In line with Garratt and
Keister (2009), our proposed specification controls for what depositors have
observed in previous rounds. More specifically, "History" is defined as the
fraction of previous rounds in which the subject witnessed a bank run.
The estimates of equation (2) are presented in Table 3. The reported
standard errors of the parameters take into account the matching group
clustering and are corrected using the bias reduced linearization (Bell and
McCa rey, 2002) that inflates residuals to correct for standard errors. If
we did not perform this correction in our logit specifications, the standard
errors would be biased and we would be more likely to reject the null hy-
pothesis than our p-values would suggest (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
The marginal e ects are evaluated at the level of the sample means and the
magnitude of the interaction e ect L12L13 is estimated according to Ai and
Norton (2003) where its is shown that the magnitude of the interaction term
in logit models does not equal the marginal e ect of the interaction term.14
Table 2: Table 3. Logit model for depositor 1
We find that the propensity to withdraw significantly decreases when the
links 12 and 13 exist. If we test the hypothesis that the link 12 has the same
impact as link 13 in reducing the probability of depositor 1’s withdrawal (i.e.,
14We undertake the same approach for depositors 2 and 3 as well. We thank a referee
for pointing out these issues.
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H0 : –1 = –2), we cannot reject that hypothesis at any common significance
level (p-value=0.815). Similarly, we cannot reject the null hypotheses that
H0 : –2 + –3 = 0 and H0 : –1 + –3 = 0 (p-values are 0.289 and 0.233,
respectively). This means that neither the link 13 nor the link 12 reduces the
probability of withdrawal once the other link is already in place. The results
in Table 3 reveal that an increase in History tends to increase depositor 1’s
probability of withdrawal (i.e., withdrawal is more likely if more bank runs
have been observed previously). As we shall see below, the same result holds
for depositor 2 and 3. These findings are consistent with Garratt and Keister
(2009) where it is found that subjects who experienced more bank runs are
more likely to withdraw.15 We summarize these findings in the following
way:
Result 3 Compared with the case with no links, both the link 12 and the
link 13 significantly reduce the probability of withdrawal of depositor 1.
When depositor 1 has one of these links, the other one does not have
any additional e ect on reducing the probability of withdrawal.
In order to analyze depositor 2’s behavior, we decompose the link 12
and account for the information it transmits. The dummy variable Y 1 (Y 0)
takes the value 1 when depositor 2 observes withdrawal (waiting) and is zero
otherwise. Therefore, if depositor 1 and 2 are not connected (i.e., if the link
12 does not exist), Y 1 = Y 0 = 0. We propose to model depositor 2’s choice
as follows:
Pr
2
(w) = z(–0 + –1Y 1 + –2Y 0 + –3L23 + –4Y 1L23 + –5History) (3)
where z and History are defined as above. Now we define L23 as a
dummy variable for the existence of the link 23. The variable Y 1L23 com-
15A related issue concerns whether learning occurs in our experiment. Because subjects
have di erent information in each round (i.e., they face a di erent problem with a di erent
equilibrium prediction) we cannot disentangle whether changes in behavior are due to the
experience in previous rounds (that is not captured by “History”) or due to the new
information structure. However, we tested whether subjects changed their behavior after
some rounds. If this were the case, we should observe changes in the regression coe cients.
We consider a Chow test where we define a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
decision is taken in the last 7 rounds (see, for example, Kennedy, 2008). The results
indicate that there is no change in behavior for any of the depositors, as we reject that
they behave di erently in the last part of the experiment.
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bines information about what depositor 2 observes and whether she is ob-
served (i.e., this variable takes the value 1 only if depositor 2 observes a
withdrawal and has a link with depositor 3).16.
Table 3: Table 4. Logit model for depositor 2
The fact that the coe cients –1 and –2 are significantly di erent from 0
suggests that the link 12 considerably a ects the behavior of depositor 2 with
respect to the case in which she has no links. The marginal e ects in Table
4 show that observing a withdrawal, significantly increases the probability
of withdrawal by nearly 30%, while observing waiting significantly decreases
this probability by 24%. The theoretical prediction states that no matter
what depositor 2 observes, she must always wait. We test H0 : –1 = –2 to
confirm that observing a withdrawal or a waiting is equally important for
depositor 2, given that the link 23 does not exists. We reject that hypoth-
esis at the 5% significance level (‰21 = 4.90, p-value=0.028). We also reject
the hypothesis that H0 : –2 = –1 + –4, therefore observing a withdrawal
and a waiting is not the same if we account for the link 23 (‰21 = 4.01,
p-value=0.046). Our data suggest that the link 12 does matter for depos-
itor 2, and unlike what the theory predicts, the observed decision is also
important. In turn, this finding indicates that bank runs may not only be
due to problems with the fundamentals of the bank or coordination problem
among depositors in a simultaneous setup. Bank runs can also be caused by
panic-based behavior in a sequential framework.
Result 4 Compared with the case with no links, the link 12 a ects depositor
2’s behavior. Observing a waiting (withdrawal) significantly decreases
(increases) the depositor 2’s probability of withdrawal.
Although most of the time depositor 3 follows the dominant strategy to wait,
one interesting question to be addressed concerns whether the propensity
to withdraw is a ected by what is being observed. We define the dummy
variables Z1, Z11, Z0 and Z10 by relying on each of the possible information
16The explanatory variable Y0 L23 is not considered in Table 4 because it predicts
waiting perfectly. That is, when depositor 2 observes a waiting and is linked with depositor
3, she always waits (10 observations)
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sets that depositor 3 may have. Depositor 3’s decision may come after
only observing a withdrawal (Z1 = 1), after observing two withdrawals
(Z11 = 1), after only observing a waiting (Z0 = 1), after observing a
withdrawal and a waiting (Z10 = 1) or simply after observing nothing (Z1 =
Z11 = Z0 = Z10 = 0). As a result, we propose the following specification
to model depositor 3’s behavior:
Pr
3
(w) = z(–0 + –1Z1 + –2Z11 + –3Z0 + –4Z10 + –5History) (4)
where z and History are defined as above. The estimates of equation
(??) are reported in Table 5.
Table 4: Table 5. Logit model for depositor 3
Although depositor 3 has a dominant strategy to wait and the network
structure should not a ect her behavior (i.e., all coe cients should be sta-
tistically insignificant), the marginal e ects reported in Table 5 reveal that
compared to the case without links, the propensity to withdraw decreases
when depositor 3 observes a waiting, or the two previous actions (i.e., two
withdrawals, or a waiting and a withdrawal). In fact, once depositor 3 ob-
serves waiting, it does not matter whether a withdrawal is also observed (i.e.,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis H0 : –3 = –4 given that ‰21 = 1.09, p-
value= 0.298). Similarly, we cannot reject that the behavior of depositor 3 is
the same when observing two actions, regardless of what she observes (i.e.,
for the null hypothesis H0 : –2 = –4 we find that ‰21 = 0.55, p-value=0.460).
We find, however, that observing a withdrawal is not the same as observing a
waiting (‰21 = 3.97, p-value=0.047) or observing two withdrawals (‰21 = 3.32,
p-value= 0.069).
These findings suggest that strategic uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty con-
cerning the action of the other depositor) may play a major role in explaining
deviations from waiting. When depositor 3 observes nothing or a with-
drawal, she does not know with certainty what the other patient depositor
has done. The observed withdrawal may come from the computer or from
the other depositor. However, when a waiting or the two previous actions
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are observed, depositor 3 does know what the other depositor has done. Im-
portantly, this is related to the computation of payo s in our experiment.
When there is no uncertainty about the other depositor’s decision, it is easy
for depositor 3 to compute her payo s. If she observes a waiting (or a wait-
ing and a withdrawal), she knows that by waiting she will get 70, whereas
withdrawal yields 50. If depositor 3 observes two withdrawals, depositor 3
gets 30 by waiting and 20 by withdrawing, computation of payo s being also
straightforward. Although waiting is a dominant strategy when depositor
3 observes either nothing or only a withdrawal, the computation of payo s
is more demanding in these cases because she has to compare payo s when
she believes that the other depositor has withdrawn and when not. For
instance, if depositor 3 observes either nothing or only a withdrawal, she
does not know whether waiting (withdrawing) will yield 70 or 30 (50 or 20).
Under these circumstances, an individual with bounded rationality might
not recognize that waiting is a dominant strategy.17 We summarize these
findings as follows.
Result 5 Compared with the case with no links, the probability of with-
drawal significantly decreases (is not a ected) when depositor 3 can
infer (cannot infer) what the other patient depositor has done.
Given these findings on the individuals’ behavior we may draw some con-
clusions about whether information structures (i.e., social networks) matter
for the emergence of bank runs. The answer is positive as depositor 1 values
the fact of being observed, whereas depositors 2 and 3 seem to be a ected
by the information transmitted through the links.
4 5. Discussion
In this paper we have studied the emergence of bank runs in a sequential
environment. Two strands of work are related to our paper: the literature
on bank runs and the experimental literature on coordination.
A sizable part of the literature on bank runs follows the work of Dia-
mond and Dybvig (1983) and models depositor behavior as a coordination
17The work of Klos and Sträter (2013) is an attempt to investigate how bounded ratio-
nality a ects bank runs. We do not elaborate on this explanation in the current study, but
the interested reader can consult the working paper version of our manuscript for further
details (see Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia, 2012b).
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problem that involves simultaneous decisions. In the experimental litera-
ture, researchers have considered simultaneous decisions to investigate the
problem of coordination among depositors (e.g., Arifovic, Jiang and Xu,
2013) or analyze if bank runs can be contagious (Brown, Trautmann and
Vlahu, 2012). Observability of past actions has received scarce attention in
the theoretical literature (see Gu, 2011), but has been investigated in labo-
ratory experiments.18 Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) motivate their paper
claiming that sequentiality should be taken into account when studying bank
runs. In their experiment they use simultaneous and sequential treatments,
so they are the first to compare outcomes when the degree of observability
di ers. They investigate how di erent factors (e.g. asymmetric information,
deposit insurance) a ect how quickly depositors withdraw.19 Theoretically,
subjects’ behavior should be invariant to the form of the game, but Schotter
and Yorulmazer (2009) find that the available information (e.g. about past
decisions) a ects the subjects’ choices. More precisely, more information
about other depositors’ decisions (by observing how many people withdrew
and their payo s in previous rounds) leads to later withdrawals under some
conditions. In our experiment, we find that the observation of previous
withdrawals increases the rate of withdrawals even in a setup where that
observation should prevent bank runs. Moreover, we underline the posi-
tive e ect of observing other depositors’ waiting, and that the possibility of
being observed also decreases the tendency to withdraw. Importantly, our
results emerge in an environment without uncertainty about the fundamen-
tals of the bank, which is an important element in Schotter and Yorulmazer
(2009).20
Two novel elements in Garratt and Keister (2009) are that in some treat-
ments subjects were given up to three opportunities of withdrawal and some-
18In Brown, Trautmann and Vlahu (2012) depositors of the same bank decide simulta-
neously, but depositors may observe the decisions of depositors of other banks.
19Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2012a) and Madies (2006) also investigate the
e ciency of deposit insurance to curb bank runs by means of laboratory experiments. In
Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2012a), we study how deposit insurance a ects
depositor behavior depending on whether decisions are simultaneous (empty network) or
fully sequential (complete network), but do not consider the case of partial information.
20In Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) uncertainty involves the fundamentals of the bank,
since banks have di erent quality that is generally unobservable to depositors. Chari and
Jagganathan (1988) show theoretically how a heightened withdrawal demand may be
perceived incorrectly as a signal that the bank’s quality is poor.
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times faced forced withdrawals. When subjects had multiple opportunities
to withdraw, they were informed about the total number of withdrawals
in their bank after each opportunity. Forced withdrawals occurred with
some probability as some subjects were not allowed to decide on their own
but were forced to withdraw; thus, the other subjects observed these forced
withdrawals. Garratt and Keister (2009) find that uncertain withdrawal
demand when subjects have multiple opportunities to withdraw lead to fre-
quent bank runs, while these factors alone do not result in a high number
of bank runs. They claim that more information about other depositors’
decisions may be harmful for coordination when there are still opportunities
to withdraw. Similarly to Garratt and Keister (2009), our experimental ev-
idence highlights that when a withdrawal is observed, bank runs are more
likely to emerge. The impatient depositor (i.e., the computer) in the first
position may increase the likelihood of bank runs. However, if depositor 1
is patient, the link 12 enforces coordination and helps to prevent bank runs
in equilibrium. Our papers diverge also in the experimental design. Unlike
Garratt and Keister (2009), we do not consider multiple possibilities of with-
drawal or force individuals to withdraw. Instead, withdrawal demand in our
experimental design is certain, so that there is no aggregate uncertainty in
our model. This is a key feature as we show that even with known with-
drawal demand the frequency of bank runs varies substantially depending
on the network structure and on the observed decisions (i.e., even in the
absence of aggregate uncertainty bank runs may occur frequently).
There are further important di erences between our work and these ex-
perimental papers on bank runs. First, in previous studies observability is
implemented by giving subjects multiple opportunities to withdraw and be-
fore each decision they obtained information about the number of previous
withdrawals. In our framework, subjects are given only one opportunity to
withdraw in each round and observability of previous decisions is constrained
by the network structure. Second, our approach is an attempt to study how
di erences in the information structure influence whether bank runs occur.
We indeed test conditions that ensure a unique equilibrium without bank
runs. Identifying the link 12 as a su cient condition to prevent bank runs
makes our paper divert from the other experimental papers (e.g., Arifovic,
Jiang and Xu, 2013; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Garratt and Keister,
2009), which do not characterize conditions that lead to a unique equilibrium
23
with no bank run.
Our paper is also related to the large literature on coordination games
in experimental economics. More specifically, the spirit of our experiment
is very much related to coordination problems in networks. The closest
paper to our in this respect is Choi et al. (2011) who analyze how the
network structure a ects coordination in a public-good game and find that
observability leads to higher cooperation in some network structures while
it is detrimental in others. In their model, the network structure is known.
Given the nature of bank runs, it seems reasonable to consider the assump-
tion of imperfect and incomplete information in our case. Despite other
obvious di erences in the model (e.g., there are no incentives to free-ride in
our model) there is a striking similarity in the results. They call strategic
commitment the tendency to make contributions early in the game to en-
courage others to contribute. This commitment is of strategic value only if
it is observed by others. Our finding that depositor 1 is more likely to wait
when observed by any of the subsequent depositors can be seen as a case of
strategic commitment.
5 6. Conclusion
An important question regarding the emergence of bank runs is what kind
of information depositors have about other depositors’ decisions. Most of
the existing theoretical models leave aside this issue and use a simultaneous-
move game to approach the problem. We generalize the information struc-
ture and suppose that an underlying social network channels the information
among depositors. This modeling choice allows for incorporating both si-
multaneous and sequential decisions in the same framework and conform to
the empirical descriptions.
We derive a theoretical prediction about depositors’ behavior in a tractable
environment that resembles a classic bank-run setup. We show that the
information structure determines whether the equilibrium is unique or mul-
tiple, contributing to the debate on this issue. No bank run is the unique
equilibrium if the first two depositors are connected. This result does not
depend on the order in which patient and impatient depositors are called
to decide and pinpoints the importance of links enabling information flow
among the depositors at the beginning of the sequence.
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We design a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical
predictions. We find evidence that the link 12 reduces the likelihood of
bank runs and produces the highest levels of e ciency. We also observe
that depositor 1’s behavior is influenced by the link 12, as predicted by
theory. Likewise, she is influenced by the link 13, being the possibility to
communicate her own decision which drives the behavior at the beginning of
the line. The link 12 also a ects the choice made by depositor 2, who tends
to act as her observed predecessor. The information transmitted through the
links matters also for depositor 3, who withdraws less often upon observing
waiting. Overall these findings contribute to the literature showing that
panic-based runs may emerge in a context when fundamental problems or
uncertainty about the distribution of types are absent (see Schotter and
Yorulmazer, 2009; Garratt and Keister, 2009).
Panic-based bank runs are usually discussed in the context of simulta-
neous decisions (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), whereas in our context runs
occur in a sequential framework. Although our setup is simple, our results
imply that policymakers should be careful about the information channels.
Early withdrawals are seen as signs of a bank run, inducing patient de-
positors to withdraw. As a result, if there are many withdrawals at the
beginning of the sequence of decision, observability may ignite a bank run.
On the other hand, if patient depositors are the first to decide, then making
their decisions observable helps to prevent bank runs. The fact that we do
not see many bank runs (even in crisis times) suggests that observability
is not complete or other factors not considered in this paper play also an
important role. For instance, the presence of insiders with valuable informa-
tion about the fundamentals of the bank may matter as well. In a setup with
insiders Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) show that "wider dissemination of
information about an evolving crisis" may slow down the crisis. Garratt
and Keister (2009) show that when withdrawal demand is uncertain, then
more information may be counterproductive, hence the role of information
is intricate.
We speculate that possibly there is a relationship between types (patient
and impatient) and depositors decision of when to go to bank. It seems a
promising venue for future research to explore the relationship between types
and position in the line, both theoretically and experimentally. Another
topic worth of further investigation is the role of aggregate uncertainty or
25
the possibility of having an endogenous network in which depositors form
their links prior to decide between waiting or withdrawing.
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Appendix A: Instructions
Welcome to the experiment!
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This is an experiment to study decision making, so we are not interested
in your particular choices but in individuals’ average behavior. Therefore,
during the experiment you’ll be treated anonymously. Neither the experi-
menters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.
Next, you will find the instructions in the computer screen explaining
how the experiment unfolds. The instructions are the same for all subjects
in the laboratory and will be read aloud by experimenters. It is important
for you to understand the experiment before starting, as the money that
you will earn will depend on your choices. You also have a copy of the
instructions on your table.
Number of rounds
This experiment has 18 rounds in total. The first 3 rounds are for you to
become familiar with the software. The remaining 15 rounds will be used
to determine your final payo , so please be sure that you understand the
experiment before starting the 4th round. This will help you to earn more
money.
What is this experiment about?
At the beginning of each round, you will be provided a certain amount of
money (40 pesetas) to be deposited in a bank. The same will be done with
two other depositors. The bank in which you will invest your money will be
formed by 3 depositors: one of them is you, the other one is someone else in
this room and the third depositor is simulated by the computer. Therefore,
the bank in which you deposit your money will have 120 pesetas per round
in total.
Choice and earnings
In principle, your decision is to choose whether to withdraw your money
from the common bank in the first period or to wait until the second period,
21Instructions are originally in Spanish.
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taking into account that your earnings will depend not only on your choice
but also on other depositors’ choices. Indeed, it is important to know that
the computer will always withdraw her money and, thus that your earnings
in each round will only depend on your choice and the choice of the other
depositor in this room.
Specifically, if you both wait until the second period to withdraw your
money, you will get 70 pesetas, corresponding to your initial investment
plus interests generated during the first period of time (in which you have
decided to wait).
If only one of you withdraws the money, then the one who withdraws
takes 50 pesetas (exactly the same amount that the computer will take in
this case). The depositor who waits will receive 30 pesetas. In this case,
this depositor receives the amount that remains in the bank after the first
period -20 pesetas- plus an additional quantity of interest.
Finally, it might be the case that you both withdraw your money in the
first period. As a result, your earnings will depend on the available amount
in the bank and your position in the line. Therefore, if you are at Position
1 or Position 2 in the line and decide to withdraw, you will take 50 pesetas,
but if you are the last one in the line (Position 3), only 20 pesetas will remain
in the bank and this is exactly the amount of money that you will receive.
Therefore, your payo s can be summarized in the following table:
Table 1. Payo s of the experiment
Please remember that the depositor simulated by the computer will al-
ways withdraw the money in the first period.
Before starting, it may be important for you to consider that:
1. The person with whom you are linked will change every round. As a
result, do not think that you are going to play with the same person.
2. You will always know your position in the line, but this position
might change in each round. In particular, you may be located at Position
1, Position 2 or Position 3 with the same probability. The same is true for
the computer.
3. In each round, you will have di erent information about what other
depositors at your bank have done. Therefore, in some cases, you will know
what has happened before you arrived at the bank (number of deferrals
and withdrawals) and in some other cases, you will not. At the time of
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making your choice, you will also know whether someone else will observe
your decision. It may be of your interest to consider this information when
making your decision. The information will appear at the left-hand side of
the computer screen:
E.g., You are at Position 1. Depositors at Position 2 and Position 3 will
observe your choice.
E.g., You are at Position 2. Depositor at Position 1 has waited. Depos-
itor at Position 3 will not observe your choices
We are now going to start with the first three rounds. At the end of
the three rounds, you can ask any questions to make sure that you have
understood the procedure. If you have any doubt afterwards, please raise
your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the experimenters as
soon as possible. Talking is forbidden during this experiment.
Appendix B: Statistical tests
We provide in this appendix some statistical tests to complement our anal-
ysis in the paper. We focus on Table 2 and compare the likelihood of bank
runs depending on whether the link 12 exists or not. The test of proportion
using pairwise comparisons always rejects the null hypothesis that the fre-
quency of bank runs in any network structure with the link 12 is the same
as the frequency of bank runs in a network without this link in favor of the
alternative that bank runs are less likely when there is link 12, except in
three cases; namely, the comparison between (12,13) and (13,23), as well as
the comparison between the network (12) and the networks (13,23) or (13).
In all these cases, the rate of withdrawal is always lower in the networks with
the link 12, but the di erence is not statistically significant. The value of
the statistics is reported in Table B1 below, where we indicate significance
after correcting for multiple testing using the Bonferroni correction.
Table B1 here
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Table&1.!Payoff!table!for!the!experiment!
&
  If you wait then… 
Number of 
previous 
withdrawals 
If you withdraw 
If the other depositor in the 
room waits and only the 
computer withdraws 
If the other depositor in 
the room and the 
computer withdraw 
0 50 70 30 
1 50 70 30 
2 20 Not applicable 30 !!!!
Notes: In total we have 718 decisions. The dummy variable yi takes the value 1 when depositor i withdraws. We report the frequency of withdrawal for each experimental subject depending 
on the computer’s position. We also report the frequency of bank runs. i.e Prob( y!!!!! > 1) and the level of efficiency in each network. This level of efficiency measures deviations from 
the maximum possible payoff (190 pesetas). The column ranking orders the network structures by considering the levels of efficiency (the lowest ranking belonging to the most efficient 
network). If two different network structures have the same level of efficiency, they are assigned the same ranking.  
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Network 
Computer 
Position 
Number 
Decisions 
Frequency of withdrawal  
 
 
Pooled Data 
Pr (!! = !) Pr (!! = !) Pr (!! = !) Likelihood Bank run Efficiency Losses Ranking Likelihood Bank Run Efficiency Losses Ranking 
! 1! 44! $! 0.39! 0.25! 0.54! !!!$32.10! 15! ! ! !
(12,13,23)! 2! 44! 0.09! $! 0.05! 0.14! !!!$8.18! 2! 0.21! $12.52! 1!
! 3! 52! 0.00! 0.00! $! 0.00! !!!!0.00! 1! ! ! !
! 1! 24! $! 0.23! 0.15! 0.25! !!!$16.67! 9!
! ! !
(12,23)! 2! 26! 0.15! $! 0.15! 0.23! !!!$14.61! 6! 0.22! $14.32! 2!
! 3! 24! 0.17! 0.17! $! 0.17! !!!$11.67! 4! ! ! !
! 1! 24! $! 0.50! 0.42! 0.67! !!!$42.50! 22! ! ! !
(12,13)! 2! 26! 0.15! $! 0.08! 0.15! !!!$10.00! 3! 0.35! $22.70! 3!
! 3! 24! 0.25! 0.17! $! 0.25! !!!$16.67! 9! ! ! !
! 1! 24! $! 0.58! 0.08! 0.58! !!!$35.83! 18! ! ! !
(12)! 2! 24! 0.25! $! 0.25! 0.42! !!!$25.83! 12! 0.39! $24.16! 4!
! 3! 24! 0.08! 0.17! $! 0.17! !!!$10.83! 4! ! ! !
! 1!! 26! $! 0.23! 0.00! 0.23! !!!$14.40! 6! ! ! !
(13,23)! 2! 24! 0.33! $! 0.08! 0.42! !!!$25.00! 12! 0.41! $24.93! 5!
! 3! 24! 0.25! 0.42! $! 0.58! !!!$35.83! 18! ! ! !
! 1! 26! $! 0.15! 0.23! 0.38! !!!$23.07! 11! ! ! !
(13)! 2! 22! 0.18! $! 0.27! 0.45! !!!$27.27! 14! 0.49! $29.43! 6!
! 3! 22! 0.18! 0.55! $! 0.64! !!!$39.10! 21! ! ! !
! 1! 26! $! 0.25! 0.00! 0.23! !!!$14.40! 6! ! ! !
(23)! 2! 22! 0.73! $! 0.18! 0.73! !!!$45.45! 23! 0.55! $34.20! 7!
! 3! 22! 0.45! 0.45! $! 0.73! !!!$45.45! 23! ! ! !
! 1! 48! $! 0.38! 0.33! 0.58! !!!$36.25! 18! ! ! !
(∅)! 2! 48! 0.29! $! 0.33! 0.54! !!!$33.33! 15! 0.56! $34.44! 8!
! 3! 48! 0.29! 0.38! $! 0.54! !!!$33.75! 15!
! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Table&2.&Likelihood)of)bank)runs)and)level)of)efficiency)in)each)possible)network!
!
Table 3. Logit model for depositor 1 
 
 Intercept L12 L13 L12L13 History 
      
Coefficient 
(!) -3.265*** (0.97) -0.919** (0.41) -1.031*** (0.14) 0.358 (0.54) 5.322*** (1.19) 
      
Marginal 
effect 
 -0.109* 
(0.06) 
-0.122*** 
(0.04) 
0.072 
(0.06) 
0.623*** 
(0.09) 
      
 
Notes. The dummy variable Lij, stands for the existence of the link ij. The estimated standard errors in 
parentheses take into account matching group clustering and are corrected using the Bias Reduced 
Linearization (Bell and McCaffrey 2002). Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. Number of observations: 238. 
Wald !!-test (p-value) = 0.000 
 
 
Table 4. Logit model for depositor 2 
 
 Intercept Y1 Y0 L23 Y1L23 History 
       
Coefficient 
(!) -2.881*** (0.68) 1.397** (0.69) -2.145** (0.96) -0.005 (0.51) -1.259 (1.11) 4.047*** (0.88) 
       
Marginal 
effect 
 
 
0.298** 
(0.15) 
-0.240** 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(0.15) 
-0.220 
(0.15) 
0.724*** 
(0.09) 
       
 
Notes. The dummy variable Y1(Y0) takes the value 1 when depositor 2 observes a withdrawal (waiting) and it 
is zero otherwise. The dummy L23 stands for the existence of the link 23. The estimated standard errors in 
parentheses take into account matching group clustering and are corrected using the Bias Reduced 
Linearization (Bell and McCaffrey 2002). Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. Number of observations: 241 
(231 after eliminating the observations that predict waiting perfectly). Wald !!-test (p-value) = 0.0000 
 
 
Table 5. Logit model for depositor 3 
 
 Intercept Z1 Z11 Z0 Z10 History 
       
Coefficient 
(!) -3.391*** (0.58) -0.056 (0.68) -1.558 (1.12) -1.001 (0.93) -0.777*** (0.12) 4.215*** (1.01) 
       
Marginal 
effect 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.07) 
-0.106*** 
(0.02) 
-0.087* 
(0.04) 
-0.073*** 
(0.02) 
0.465*** 
(0.10) 
       
 
Notes.- The dummy variable Z1 (Z0) takes the value 1 when depositor 3 observes a withdrawal (waiting). The 
dummy Z11 stands for the case in which depositor 3 observes 2 withdrawals and Z10 for the case in which she 
observes a withdrawal and a waiting. The estimated standard errors in parentheses take into account matching 
group clustering and are corrected using the Bias Reduced Linearization (Bell and McCaffrey 2002). 
Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. Number of observations: 239. Wald !!-test (p-value) = 0.0000 
 
 
